That concern has been reflected in the increasingly active multilateral security agreement among the United States, Japan, Australia and India known as the Quad, which “has been driven solely by perception of the threat of China,” according to Auslin. Between perennial Indo-Chinese border disputes, Chinese attempts to infiltrate the Australian Parliament and saber rattling with Japan over the Senkaku islands, which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by Beijing, there’s been plenty in recent years to cause heartburn for New Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra.
But Trump’s unilateral attempts to get tough on Beijing largely failed to produce results.
“Trump had been convinced by some key advisers that if you start a trade war with China, they will buckle; didn’t happen,” said Khalil, who added that ramped-up rhetoric has only caused China to respond in kind.
Meanwhile, the Biden administration, McMann said, “is seeing that a multilateral coalition willing to push back on China would potentially be more successful.” Still, challenges to marshalling the true power of a multilateral security arrangement among democracies in the Asia-Pacific region remain daunting — notably the long history of animosity between Seoul and Tokyo, and New Zealand’s strong opposition to participating in agreements involving nuclear or biological weapons.
But nothing is set in stone, and McMann said that while India has historically avoided making strong commitments to Washington, Chinese escalation along their disputed frontier, investment in archrival Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road Initiative and the pace of Chinese military development are all helping push New Delhi toward greater engagement.
Auslin argued that the multilateral approach “makes it easier for the Indians to participate because it’s not demanding a bilateral commitment” or making the country “choose sides.” In fact, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is making it clear that India still blazes its own trail in foreign affairs by signing a series of agreements this week meant to deepen New Delhi’s military ties with Russia, to the chagrin of U.S. officials. Nonetheless, experts interviewed for this story all agreed that America’s improved image in the region is a cause for concern in Beijing.
It’s not you, it’s U.S.
Despite America’s renewed commitment to multilateral diplomacy, allies see storm clouds looming over 2024. Another term in the White House for Trump or another populist, isolationist figure could scuttle the Biden administration’s efforts to build international coalitions. Still, it’s unlikely that America’s allies would decide to walk away even if Washington returned to a unilateral foreign policy, experts said.
“We do have formal alliances with Japan and Australia and South Korea and others. And so there is a limit to how far we can diverge — at least, short of crisis,” said Auslin. McMann agreed that the structural forces for sticking by the United States ultimately apply in Europe as well, arguing that despite any NATO allies’ differences on rhetoric and policy, “it's just not feasible, necessarily, to have a complete divorce.” And Khalil said that overturning the diplomatic work of the better part of a century is a massive undertaking that Trump did not accomplish despite four years of his signature “America First” foreign policy.
But historian Anne Applebaum sees the situation with U.S. allies in less sanguine terms. In a showdown with NATO allies, she said, the United States always holds the high cards, as was repeatedly demonstrated during the Trump years.
“The Europeans will put up with anything because they have no choice. They have built no alternative” to deter Russian aggression, Applebaum said, adding that when it comes to the future of America’s global alliance system, the real question is: “Will America want it to last?”
The worst-case scenario for America’s partners, according to Applebaum, would be another Trump victory in 2024. “Trump would destroy the alliances forever. I think that’d be the end of NATO if he won again. I think it would be the end of the alliance with South Korea. I think that's the end.”
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